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Abstract: Kant holds that some non-human animals “are acquainted with” objects, despite 
lacking conceptual capacities (“understanding”). What does this tell us about his theory of 
human cognition? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour of 
Nonconceptualism—the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do not 
depend on the understanding. Against this, I argue that Kant’s views about animal minds can 
readily be accommodated by a certain kind of Conceptualism. It remains viable to think that, 
for Kant, (i) humans’ sensible representations necessarily represent objects as temporally 
structured, in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and (ii) such representations 
are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. This allows Conceptualists 
to maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while 
accepting that animals have sensible representations of objects too. We must, therefore, 
reassess both the warrant for Nonconceptualism and the shape Conceptualist readings must 
take. 
Keywords: Kant, nonconceptualism, intuition, synthesis, animal minds 
1. Introduction 
The Critique of Pure Reason (“KrV”) advances a rich account of human cognition. Central to Kant’s 
account are two related ideas: 
(1) Intuitions and Concepts. Cognition (i.e. thoughts that have objective representational 
purport) requires us to unify two kinds of mental representation, viz. intuitions (i.e. sensible 
representations of particulars) and concepts (i.e. general representations). 
(2) Sensibility and Understanding. Cognition requires the interaction of two distinct mental 
capacities, viz. sensibility (i.e. the capacity to acquire representations through being affected 
by objects) and understanding (i.e. the capacity to form concepts and thoughts). 
Interpreters of Kant disagree about how these distinctions line up. Does Kant believe that our 
intuitions require only sensibility, or do they also depend on a contribution from the understanding? 
The two opposing sides can be characterized as follows: 
Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions depend on the understanding as well as 
sensibility. 
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Nonconceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions do not depend on the understanding, 
but are produced by sensibility on its own.1 
Clearly, if we see value in making sense of Kant’s theory of cognition, we need to try and make 
headway with the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate. 
Recently, several writers have tried to do just this by drawing on Kant’s remarks about non-
human animals (henceforth “animals”). Kant holds that animals lack the capacity of understanding. 
Therefore, these remarks promise to shed light on what he thinks sensibility can accomplish on its 
own. In recent years, something of a consensus has emerged that Kant’s remarks about animals 
“clearly support Nonconceptualism”.2 This is because he appears to credit them with intuitions even 
though they lack understanding. 
In what follows, I argue that Kant does credit animals with intuitions, but that an attractive 
form of Conceptualism can accommodate this. Contrary to the consensus, Kant’s views about 
animals don’t provide evidence for Nonconceptualism, as they are equally compatible with some 
forms of Conceptualism. Nevertheless, they impose strict limits on the shape Conceptualist readings 
must take. 
Section 2 explains why we should take seriously the charge that Kant’s views about animals 
support Nonconceptualism. Section 3 argues that Kant really does ascribe intuitions to animals. I 
analyse a wide range of texts and argue that, even though the sources are inherently unreliable, the 
sheer number and coherence of these passages makes it implausible that they are all errata. Section 4 
begins explaining how Conceptualists can accommodate Kant’s commitment to animal intuition. I 
identify logical space for a “Restricted” Conceptualism, according to which humans’ intuitions are 
produced by the understanding and belong to a kind that could not be produced in its absence. 
Section 5 argues that Restricted Conceptualism is not only logically possible but prima facie plausible. 
I present evidence that, for Kant, humans’ intuitions are qualitatively different from those of 
animals. I argue that there is ample prima facie evidence that (i) humans’ intuitions necessarily 
represent objects as temporally structured, in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, and 
(ii) such intuitions are produced, and could only be produced, by the understanding. Conceptualists 
therefore have an attractive way of upholding the dependence of human intuitions on the 
understanding while accepting that animals have intuitions too. I conclude (Section 6) by 
highlighting the substantive differences between Restricted Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism 
on which future research must focus. 
 
1 See McLear (2014:772) and Gomes (2016:540, 550f.) for this way of framing the debate. I set aside related questions 
which have also featured prominently in the debate, such as the content of intuitions (Allais, 2009; Tolley, 2013) and 
their dependence upon concept-possession (Ginsborg, 2008:5; Grüne, 2009:ch.5). 
2 Allais (2016:8), echoing Gomes (2014:6f.). This consensus has been challenged by two articles discussed below (Land, 
2018; van den Berg, 2018). My approach bears affinities with Land’s, but I go beyond his short discussion by motivating 
a detailed account of how Conceptualists can accommodate animal intuitions; by explaining how the resulting 
interpretation upholds not just the letter but the spirit of Conceptualism; and by assessing the alternative response of 
denying Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. 
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2. From Animal Intuitions to Nonconceptualism? 
Why would Kant’s supposed commitment to animal intuitions be thought to support 
Nonconceptualism? Consider this argument: 
The Argument from Animal Intuitions 
(1) Kant holds that animals lack the capacity of understanding. 
(2) Kant holds that animals are capable of having intuitions. 
(3) Therefore, it is incoherent to ascribe to Kant the view that intuitions depend on the 
understanding. 
Arguments of this kind are endorsed by Lucy Allais (2009:405–407, 2016:8f.), Colin McLear (n.d., 
2011:14, 2014:773) and Anil Gomes (2014:6f.). These authors present the argument in passing, 
devoting only a few lines to it, but it’s easy to see why they think it poses a problem for 
Conceptualists. The conclusion is tantamount to a denial of Conceptualism. And the inference has 
serious intuitive appeal: if the premises are true, the intuitions of animals cannot possibly depend on 
the understanding; this makes it hard to see how we could go on maintaining that intuitions depend 
on the understanding. Should we conclude that Conceptualism is false? The only other options are 
to deny one of the argument’s premises or to question its validity. Before proceeding to my main 
discussion, let me note the strong textual support for premise (1), which is not typically taken to be 
controversial. 
Although Kant credits animals with more complex mental lives than some of his 
predecessors did (see Naragon, 1990), he is unequivocal in denying them the capacity of 
understanding. Kant writes that “a human being has, in his understanding, something more than 
[“the rest of the animals”]” (MS 6:434; cf. A546/B574, V-Met-K3E/Arnoldt 29:949, 1017). This is 
elaborated upon in a lecture transcript: 
A concept is the consciousness that the [same] is contained in one representation as in 
another, or that in multiple representations one and the same features are contained. […] 
Animals indeed compare representations with one another, but they are not conscious of 
where the harmony or disharmony between them lies. Therefore they also have no concepts, 
and also no higher cognitive faculty, because the higher cognitive faculty consists of these. 
(Vo-Met/Mron 29:888) 
Animals can identify and discriminate objects by means of mental representations (as we’ll see 
below), but they cannot identify or discriminate dimensions of similarity or difference among 
objects. This renders them incapable of forming general representations, i.e. concepts. In lacking this 
ability, Kant states that they lack any “higher cognitive faculty”.3 In other passages, Kant identifies 
the kind of consciousness which animals lack as “consciousness of ourselves” or “apperception”, 
and explains that our capacity for concepts depends on our distinctive capacity for self-
consciousness: “animals […] will forgo only those representations which rest […] on the 
 
3 Kant characterizes the understanding as a “higher cognitive faculty” (e.g. Anth 7:196, Refl 210a 15:81). 
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consciousness of oneself, in short on the concept of the I. Accordingly they will have no 
understanding and no reason”(V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28:277; cf. ibid. 28:278, Anth 7:127, H 7:397, V-
Anth/Mron 25:1215, V-Met/Mron 29:878f.). 
Kant clearly and consistently denies that animals possess understanding. It follows that 
Conceptualists must either deny that Kant really credits animals with intuitions or deny that the 
Argument from Animal Intuitions is valid. 
3. Kant’s Commitment to Animal Intuitions 
Is it viable to deny that Kant credits animals with intuitions? Since this remains controversial, I’ll 
scrutinize the full range of textual evidence, including some passages that haven’t been discussed 
hitherto (Section 3.1). I’ll then argue that these texts cumulatively amount to very strong evidence 
that Kant ascribes intuitions to animal, even though they stem from imperfectly reliable sources. 
Given their number and coherence, it’s highly unlikely that they are all errata (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Texts 
There are six passages demonstrating Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. I begin with three 
attributing intentional states to animals,4 followed by three indicating that these are intuitions. The 
first comes from the Jäsche Logic (1800): 
Regarding the objective content of our cognition in general, we may think the following 
levels, towards which cognition can be elevated in this respect: 
The first level of cognition is: to represent something; 
[…] 
The third: to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to represent something in comparison 
with other things, both as to sameness and as to difference; 
The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e., to cognize it (cognoscere). 
Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them. (9:64–5)5 
In normal usage, “acquaintance [kennen]” picks out an intentional mental state. When one is 
“acquainted with something”, the “something” is the intentional object of this mental state. Kant 
 
4
 By an ‘intentional state’, I mean a representation that represents an object. “Intentional” thus corresponds to Kant’s 
term “objective” in one of its uses (e.g. A320/B376). I suspect that “intentionality” is equivalent to Kant’s notion of a 
representation’s “relation to the object [Beziehung auf das Objekt ]”. However, some have argued that the latter is a 
narrower notion which builds in the requirement of ‘determination’ by a concept and hence doesn’t cover all 
representations of objects (see Allais, 2015:155–175). I’ll remain neutral on this issue as far as possible. 
5 “In Ansehung des objectiven Gehaltes unserer Erkenntniß überhaupt lassen sich folgende Grade  denken, nach 
welchen dieselbe in dieser Rücksicht kann gesteigert werden: / Der erste  Grad der Erkenntniß ist: sich etwas 
vors te l len ; […] / Der dr i t te : etwas kennen (noscere) oder sich etwas in der Vergleichung mit andern Dingen 
vorstellen sowohl der Einer le ihe i t  als der Verschiedenhe i t  nach; / Der v ier te : mi t  Bewußtse in  etwas kennen, 
d. h. erkennen (cognoscere). Die Thiere kennen auch Gegenstände, aber sie erkennen sie nicht.” Emphasis in 
quotations is Kant’s own unless noted otherwise. 
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uses the term “acquaintance [Kenntnis, kennen]” in this sense in various works.6 Hence, when he 
asserts that “animals are acquainted with objects”, we have every reason to think he is crediting them 
with intentional states. 
Several further facts confirm this. (a) Kant explicitly characterizes “acquaintance” as a way of 
“represent[ing]” the thing in question. (b) The remark occurs in the course of distinguishing levels of 
the “objective content” of “cognition”. Kant consistently affirms that “all our cognition has […] a 
relation to the object” (Log 9:33; cf. 9:91, A320/B376),7 never using “cognition” to designate non-
intentional states.8 By introducing “acquaintance” as a level of “cognition” with “objective content”, 
Kant is classifying it as an intentional representation. (c) Kant also introduces the notion of 
“acquaintance” in a similar graded list from the pre-‘Critical’ Blomberg Logic (early 1770s), 
characterizing it in the same way and explicitly describing it as a way of “cognizing” a thing (24:135). 
Together, this makes a very strong case that the “acquaintance” Kant ascribes to animals is a 
representation with intentionality.9 
The next passage comes from the Wiener Logic (1780–1781). Once again, Kant offers a 
graded list of types of mental representation: 
1. The lowest level is to represent something. When I cognize that which relates to the 
object, I represent the object. 
2. To cognize, percipere, is to represent something in comparison with others and to have 
insight into its identity or diversity from them. […] For animals also cognize their master, 
but they are not conscious of this. (24:845f.)10 
What Kant here describes as “cognizing” has the same features as “acquaintance” in the previous 
list. It is an intentional representation which allows for the identification and discrimination of 
objects. As argued above, Kant’s choice of the term “cognize” indicates that this is an intentional 
state. This is again confirmed by the context: (a) earlier in this transcript, Kant is recorded as 
 
6 A207/B252, A540/B568, G 4:451, KpV 5:51. 
7 These passages explicitly deploy the term “relation to the object” in a broad sense that covers the intentionality of 
intuitions (cf. fn. 4). 
8 N.b. Kant uses the term “cognition” to designate two different kinds of intentional state (see below). “[C]ognition in 
general” at the beginning of the passage appears to be cognition in the broad sense; “cognizing” in the “fourth level” is 
most likely cognition in the narrow sense. 
9
 Caution is required concerning the dating of commitments expressed in the Jäsche Logic. The notes on which Jäsche’s 
text is based span much of Kant’s career, so one can doubt whether a given passage represents Kant’s mature views. 
However, as noted, Kant uses the notion of “acquaintance [Kenntnis]” in various ‘Critical’-era works. Moreover, the 
corresponding Reflection (Refl 2394 16:342f.) bears evidence of continued revision, suggesting that it is not a relic of 
Kant’s pre-‘Critical’ thought. The phrase concerning animals is absent from this Reflection, suggesting that it is drawn 
from the lost lecture transcript, “presumably derived from […] late in [Kant’s] career”, on which scholars think much of 
the Jäsche Logic is based (Young, 1992:xviii–xix). Further issues of authenticity are addressed below. 
10 “1.) der niedrigste Grad ist sich etwas vorstellen. Wenn ich das, was sich auf den Gegenstand bezieht, erkenne: so stell 
ich mir den Gegenstand vor. / 2.) erkennen, percipere, heißt sich etwas in Vergleichung mit andern vorstellen, und seine 
identitaet oder Verschiedenheit davon einsehen. […] Denn Thiere erkennen auch ihren Herrn aber sind sich deßen nicht 
bewußt.” 
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affirming that “all our cognitions” exhibit “relation to the object” (in a broad sense that explicitly 
covers the intentionality of intuitions, 24:805); (b) the “lowest level” on this list already requires 
“represent[ing] an object”, indicating that these are divisions within the domain of intentional states; 
(c) Kant explicitly glosses “to cognize” as a way “to represent something”. Therefore, when Kant 
affirms that “animals also cognize their master”, we have overwhelming reason to think this is a 
state with intentionality. 
Why the discrepancy in terminology between the Jäsche and Wiener passages? The former 
states that “animals […] do not cognize [objects]” (Log 9:65), the latter that “animals […] cognize their 
master” (Vo/L-Wiener 24:846). Does this apparent contradiction suggest unreliable transcription? 
We should not draw this conclusion, because there is strong independent evidence that Kant uses 
the term “cognition” in two different senses. In the broad sense, “cognition” means a representation 
that represents an object, e.g. a concept, intuition or judgment, while “cognition” in the narrow sense 
means an objectively valid synthetic judgment (cf. Grüne, 2009:29; Watkins & Willaschek, 2017:84–7). 
Even within the Jäsche passage, Kant uses the term in these two senses: the list as a whole deals with 
different levels of cognition in the broad sense, while the “fourth level” isolates cognition in the 
narrow sense. Consequently, we can easily reconcile the two passages: in the Jäsche passage, Kant 
denies that animals have cognition in the narrow sense, i.e. objectively valid synthetic judgments; in 
the Wiener passage, he affirms that animals have cognition in the broad sense, i.e. intentional 
representations.11 
Is it significant for our purposes that the Wiener passage denies that animals are “conscious 
of” “cognizing their master”? In KrV’s “Stufenleiter”, Kant appears to categorize “cognition” and 
“intuition” as forms of “perception [Perzeption]”, i.e. “representation with consciousness” 
(A320/B376f.; cf. Log 9:91). Therefore, there is a prima facie tension between Kant’s denial that 
animals’ cognitions are conscious and his affirmation that they are cognitions. However, there are 
various other passages in which Kant affirms the existence of unconscious cognitions and 
intuitions.12 Hence, there are good reasons for explaining away the tension, rather than reading Kant 
as denying the possibility of unconscious cognitions or intuitions. Here are three possibilities for 
reconciling unconscious cognition with the “Stufenleiter” passage: (i) the passage could be read not 
as defining “cognition” as “objective perception”, but merely asserting that all “objective 
perceptions” are “cognitions”. This leaves open the possibility that some cognitions are not 
perceptions. (ii) Since Kant is interested in multiple kinds of consciousness, perhaps the kind of 
consciousness that animal (and other unconscious) cognitions lack is different from the kind of 
consciousness required for cognition (see McLear, 2011). (iii) Perhaps Kant uses the terms 
“cognition” and “intuition” in a non-standard way in the “Stufenleiter”, e.g. because (general and 
transcendental) logic excludes unconscious representations from consideration (see V-Lo/Busolt 
24:635, Log 9:33). I conclude that the apparent tension in Kant’s attribution of unconscious 
cognitions to animals can be diffused. 
 
11 This is further supported by the fact that Kant translates “cognition” with two different Latin terms in the two 
passages, viz. “cognoscere” in Jäsche versus “perscipere” in Wiener. Thanks to Reed Winegar for this point. 
12 Refl 1705 16:88, Vo-L/Wiener 24:805, V-Lo/Busolt 24:635; Anth 7:135, Refl 1705 16:88. Furthermore, copious passages 
refer to unconscious concepts, which also constitute a species of unconscious cognition (see Grüne, 2009:84–102). 
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A further remark, in the transcript of Kant’s anthropology lectures of 1784–1785, adds 
further weight: “Animals do have representations of the world but not of their I. Consequently, they 
are not rational beings” (V-Anth/Mron 25:1215).13 To have “representations of the world” is to have 
mental states that are intentionally directed at external things. 
Together, these three passages provide robust evidence that Kant ascribes intentional states 
to animals. Are these intentional states intuitions, as premise (2) of the Argument from Animal 
Intuitions claims? Since animals possess sensibility but lack understanding, their representations of 
objects must be sensible representations, so it’s natural to conclude that they are intuitions. This is 
borne out by three more passages from lecture transcripts: 
Animals cannot make concepts, there are sheer intuitions with them (V-Met-L2/Pölitz 
28:594).14  
Animals are not capable of any concept – intuition they do have (Vo/L-Dohna 24:702).15  
Now how can we conceive animals as beings below humans? […] [W]e can think of things 
which are below us, whose representations are different in species and not merely in degree. 
We perceive in ourselves a specific feature of the understanding and of reason, namely 
consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something left, namely, sensation, 
imagination, the former is intuition with presence, the latter without presence of the object[.] 
(V-Met/Volckmann, 28:449)16 
The first two passages simply attribute intuitions to animals. In the third, Kant reflects on the 
capacities an animal would have by imagining a creature lacking higher cognitive faculties. He states 
that such creatures would still have the capacity for “intuition with presence […] of the object” and 
“[intuition] without presence of the object”, i.e. that animals without understanding could still have 
intuitions. 
It’s unsurprising that Kant classifies the cognitions of animals as intuitions: he holds that 
“besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through concepts” (A68/B92f.). This is 
reaffirmed in the numerous passages in which he presents the contrast between intuitions and 
conceptual representations as a disjunction, i.e. an exhaustive distinction (A320/B376f., Log 9:91, 
Refl 1705 16:88, Vo-L/Wiener 24:805). Since animals lack concepts, it follows that whenever Kant 
credits them with cognitions he must tacitly be crediting them with intuitions. 
 
13 “Die Thiere haben zwar Vorstellungen von der Welt aber nicht von ihrem Ich. Daher sind sie auch keine vernünftige 
Wesen.” 
14 “Thiere können sich nicht Begriffe machen, es sind lauter Anschauungen bei ihnen.” 
15 “Tiere [sind] keiner Begriffe fähig — Anschauung haben sie.” 
16 “Wie können wir nun die Thiere concipieren als Weesen [sic] unter dem Menschen. […] [W]ir [können] uns Dinge 
denken, die unter uns sind, deren Vorstellungen der specie nicht blos dem Grad nach unterschieden sind. Wir nehmen in 
uns ein specifisch [sic] Merkmahl des Verstandes und der Vernunft, nehmlich das Bewustseyn, wahr, nehme ich dieses 
hinweg so bleibt doch noch etwas übrig nehmlich sensus, imaginatio, erstres ist die Anschauung bey der Gegenwart, 
leztres ohne Gegenwart des Gegenstandes[.]” 




I have identified six passages providing evidence that Kant credits animals with intuitions. Let me 
now discuss the possibility of rejecting these texts as inauthentic. All these passages come from 
sources of imperfect reliability. Though published in Kant’s lifetime, the Jäsche Logic was not directly 
written by Kant; it was compiled by a former student of his, using Kant’s marginalia and perhaps 
one or more lecture transcript. As a result, the consensus is that “one cannot simply assume […] 
that Jäsche’s manual is a reliable statement of Kant’s views” (Young, 1992:xvi–xviii; cf. Boswell, 
1988). The other sources are still more questionable: they are students’ transcripts from Kant’s 
lectures. They have barely been edited and were certainly not checked for accuracy by Kant. 
Discussing the logic lectures, the editor of a recent edition writes, “[O]ne cannot look to [them], in 
general, for precise, carefully worded formulations of fundamental points” (Young, 1992:xix). I’ve 
argued that the texts display a commitment to animal intuitions, but it remains possible that in doing 
so they misrepresent Kant’s views. Would it be legitimate for the Conceptualist to reject the textual 
evidence as inauthentic? 
There are two reasons why this would be inadvisable. Firstly, the evidence from all these 
sources points in the same direction. I have identified passages from six different works asserting 
that animals have representations of objects, and I am unaware of any passage denying this. We 
would expect any transcription errors to be distributed fairly randomly, pointing in divergent 
directions. On the contrary, these passages all support the same conclusion, thus rendering it highly 
implausible that they are all errata. Secondly, historians of philosophy should not be too cavalier 
about declaring passages inauthentic. Our task is to find the most coherent interpretation of the 
texts we have, so we should demand positive reason before excluding any passage from 
consideration. The Conceptualist might reply that these texts are shown to be inauthentic by the 
very fact (if it is a fact) that they cannot be reconciled with Conceptualism. However, this would 
simply beg the question against the Nonconceptualist, as well as conceding that the passages provide 
prima facie support for Nonconceptualism. At this stage, it seems likely that the 
Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate can only be settled by weighing prima facie evidence: no 
knock-down arguments have been identified by either side. It follows that Conceptualists should be 
reluctant to concede that they cannot accommodate these passages.  
A further possibility is that there are more substantive, less baldly circular reasons for 
denying Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. In a recent article, Hein van den Berg (2018) 
argues that Kant doesn’t credit animals with “objective perceptual awareness” by comparing his 
views with two of his predecessors, Reimarus (1694–1786) and Buffon (1707–1788). The article 
highlights some interesting parallels, but its main argument seems to rely on an ambiguous use of its 
central term, viz. the notion of a “blooming, buzzing confusion”. At best, van den Berg provides 
evidence that, for Kant, animal representations are “blooming, buzzing confusions” in the sense of 
being “confused” or “obscure” (2018:7). But he seems to conclude on this basis alone that animals’ 
representations are “blooming, buzzing confusions” in the further sense of lacking intentionality 
(2018:8). However, as noted above, Kant holds that some unconscious or “obscure” representations 
are nonetheless intentional. Therefore, it isn’t legitimate to infer that animals’ representations lack 
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intentionality from the fact that they are obscure. Without argument to bridge this gap, van den 
Berg’s case is not compelling. 
A different reason for denying the authenticity of the texts is that they are in tension with 
certain passages in KrV which seemingly state that synthesis according to the categories is a 
precondition for intentionality.17 Here are two particularly compelling passages: 
[A]ll appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must stand under a priori rules 
of their synthetic unity, in accordance with which their relation in empirical intuition is alone 
possible, i.e., […] in experience they must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of 
apperception[.] (A110, emphasis added) 
[W]ithout that sort of unity [of consciousness], which has its rule a priori, and which subjects 
the appearances to itself, thoroughgoing and universal, hence necessary unity of 
consciousness would not be encountered in the manifold of perceptions. But these would 
then belong to no experience, and would consequently be without an object, and would be nothing 
but a blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream. (A112, emphasis added) 
On the face of it, these passages say that without the forms of unity introduced by the 
understanding, sensible representations would lack intentionality. One might try to reply that Kant is 
referring to some higher cognitive achievement than mere intuition. However, these are not 
statements about the objects of “cognition”, “thought” or “experience” (as with some other 
passages, e.g. A111, A129f.), but about “appearances”, i.e. the objects of intuition (A20/B34, 
A34/B51, A35/B52).18 
Do these KrV passages really conflict with the texts assembled above? I do not believe so. 
There are good reasons for thinking that Kant is talking here specifically about the preconditions for 
intentionality in human minds. He cannot be talking about the minds of all beings: that would include 
the divine intellect, to which Kant’s talk of “experience” would be inapplicable. The remaining 
options are either that Kant is considering sensible minds in general, i.e. both human and animal 
minds, or that he is only considering human minds. But Kant explicitly signals that he is discussing 
“how objects are to be given to us”, and he talks freely about apperception without signalling that 
some minds lack this capacity. This strongly suggests that Kant is only making assertions about 
human minds here. The availability of this reading means that these passages don’t straightforwardly 
contradict the textual evidence amassed in Section 3.1. Of course, what Kant says about human 
minds in KrV might have ramifications for animal minds—several Conceptualist readers have 
 
17 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this. 
18 An anonymous reviewer suggests that we might read these passages as concerning objects of experience after all. Kant 
talks in terms of objects being given “through” appearances, so it’s not totally obvious that the objects in question are 
themselves appearances (i.e. objects of intuition). If a reading along these lines can be worked out, then there are two 
ways of diffusing the conflict between these passages and the evidence for animal intuitions. However, I worry that this 
route presupposes a numerical (rather than conceptual) distinction between appearances and objects of experience—that 
the tree we intuit is numerically distinct from the tree about which we form empirical judgments—which seems 
implausible for various reasons. 
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thought that Kant’s account of human cognition entails that animal minds lack intentionality. But I 
will argue below that Conceptualists needn’t accept this. For now, suffice it to say that there is no 
direct conflict. 
Pending other substantive objections, we ought to conclude that Kant really does credit 
animals with intuitions. Therefore, the Conceptualist cannot respond to the Argument from Animal 
Intuitions by denying either of its premises. The next section begins exploring the one remaining 
option: questioning the argument’s validity. 
4. The Logical Space for Restricted Conceptualism 
This section will argue that there is logical space for maintaining a restricted form of Conceptualism, 
while accepting Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. The inspiration for this route comes from 
John McDowell (1994:114–123). Defending an account of perceptual experience like that ascribed 
to Kant by Conceptualists, McDowell considers a possible objection: doesn’t his theory, according 
to which perceptual experience depends on activities of one’s conceptual capacities, entail that 
animals lack “outer experience”? McDowell responds that animals are capable of a certain kind of 
experience of outer objects, though one that is radically different from our own. In effect, his 
version of conceptualism is restricted in scope: he doesn’t hold that all kinds of outer experience 
depend on conceptual capacities, but he does insist that conceptual capacities play an indispensable 
role in generating the outer experience of humans. McDowell holds that experiences of the kind we 
possess depend on conceptual capacities.19 
We needn’t examine McDowell’s views about the difference between animal and human 
experience; what matters for us is the shape of his strategy. McDowell reconciles two claims: (a) our 
outer experience depends on conceptual capacities and (b) animals lacking those capacities are 
nevertheless capable of outer experience. He does so by restricting the dependence claim of (a) to a 
certain kind of outer experience. 
Although McDowell’s response isn’t proposed as an interpretation of Kant, it is clearly 
germane to our discussion. To see how this relates to the Argument from Animal Intuitions, 
consider our specification of Conceptualism: 
Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions depend on the understanding. 
This formulation is indeterminate in scope and can therefore be understood in (at least) two ways: 
Universal Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions of all kinds depend on the 
understanding. 
Restricted Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions of the kind humans possess depend 
on the understanding. 
Universal Conceptualism is vulnerable to the Argument from Animal Intuitions. If intuition per se 
were impossible without a contribution from the understanding, then animals would lack intuitions. 
The importance of this result mustn’t be underestimated. Arguably, the default view among 
 
19 A similar view is defended by Boyle (2014). 
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Conceptualists has been that no intentional states are possible without the understanding.20 The 
Argument from Animal Intuitions shows that this is not the correct way to read Kant. However, 
Restricted Conceptualism upholds the claim that, within the human mind, all intuitions are produced 
by the understanding. And yet it can be reconciled with the premises of the Argument from Animal 
Intuitions, because it doesn’t entail that intuitions of whatsoever kind are impossible without the 
understanding. If Restricted Conceptualism is a viable reading, then Kant’s commitment to animal 
intuitions does not support Nonconceptualism, but is consistent with Conceptualism. 
The logical space for this kind of response to the Argument from Animal Intuitions has 
already been highlighted by a recent short discussion (Land, 2018). In one sense, this is enough to 
defang the argument, showing that it is formally invalid. However, more needs to be done to make 
this response dialectically effective. Firstly, we need some positive motivation for pursuing 
Restricted Conceptualism before it can be seen as a serious alternative to Nonconceptualism. 
Secondly, we might suspect that the Restricted Conceptualist is in danger of giving up the spirit of 
Conceptualism by reducing the dependence of human intuition upon the understanding to the point 
of triviality. Some Nonconceptualists accept that the understanding makes possible qualitatively 
different kinds of sensible representation, so something must be said to convince us that Restricted 
Conceptualism is more than a notational variant of Nonconceptualism. I therefore aim to go beyond 
Land’s by offering prima facie evidence for a detailed version of Restricted Conceptualism and by 
explaining how this reading upholds not just the letter but the spirit of Conceptualism.21 
5. Restricted Conceptualism Defended 
I begin by identifying new textual motivations for Restricted Conceptualism (Section 5.1), before 
setting out a detailed version of the view (Section 5.2). I aim to show that the resulting interpretation 
is a well-motivated alternative to Nonconceptualism, rather than an ad hoc evasion of the Argument 
from Animal Intuitions. 
5.1 Textual Motivations 
There are two passages in which Kant suggests that human intuitions and animal intuitions are 
qualitatively different. These give us prima facie reason to take Restricted Conceptualism seriously. 
The first, which came up earlier, is this: 
Now how can we conceive animals as beings below human beings? […] [W]e can think of 
things which are below us, whose representations are different in species and not merely in degree. We 
perceive in ourselves a specific feature of the understanding and of reason, namely 
 
20 E.g. Ginsborg (2008:65), Bauer (2012:227–229), Griffith (2012:2000–2006). Grüne also holds that intentionality 
depends on conceptual capacities, but leaves open the possibility that a being could possess a capacity for rule-governed 
sensible synthesis while lacking the capacity to judge, and hence have intuitions without fully possessing understanding 
(2009:202f.). 
21 The resulting view is very much in line with the account of human cognition Land develops in earlier articles (e.g. 
2006, 2011). 
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consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something left, namely […] intuition 
with […] [and] without presence of the object (V-Met/Volckmann 28:449, emphasis added) 
Here, Kant apparently states that animals’ intuitions are different in species from our 
representations. If Nonconceptualism were true, this would be surprising. On that view, there is a 
class of our representations, namely our (most basic)22 intuitions, which float free from the cognitive 
differences between animals and ourselves. Hence, we would expect Kant to say that the 
representations of animals are different in species from our concepts, judgments, etc., but of the same 
species as our intuitions. But this is not what he asserts. Instead of equating animal intuitions with 
humans’ (most basic) intuitions, his phrasing indicates that their intuitions are “different in species” 
from any representations we possess, including our intuitions. Therefore, the passage poses a problem 
for Nonconceptualism.23 In contrast, it fits perfectly with Restricted Conceptualism—it supports the 
idea that our intuitions, in virtue of being generated by the understanding, are qualitatively different 
from anything animals could possess. 
The same idea is repeated in Kant’s manuscript for the Anthropology: 
The cow, lacking understanding, may well <perhaps> have something similar to what we 
call representations (because, in terms of effects, they coincide <greatly> with 
representations in humans) but which might be completely different from them. (H 7:397)24 
Here, Kant doesn’t specify what kind of representations the cow “may” have, but given what we saw 
in Section 3, I see no reason to doubt that he would credit them with sensible representations of 
objects.25 Kant is more tentative here, but he still avoids equating the cow’s representations with our 
own sensible representations. Instead, he raises the possibility that the cow’s representations are 
“completely different” from our representations. As above, the potential contrast is not between 
animals’ intuitions and our concepts, but between animals’ intuitions and our representations in 
general, including—it is implied—our intuitions. Again, the Restricted Conceptualist can readily 
explain this. In contrast, the Nonconceptualist, who holds that the understanding plays no role in 
producing our (most basic) intuitions, is faced with a puzzle. Why might the cow’s intuitions be 
“completely different” from all our representations, if our (most basic) intuitions are independent of 
the cognitive differences between ourselves and cows? 
 
22
 Some Nonconceptualists hold that the understanding is involved in converting basic intuitions into more complex 
intuitions (e.g. McLear, n.d.). But on this view, our most basic intuitions would be untouched by the understanding and 
hence of the same kind as animal intuitions. 
23 An anonymous reviewer suggests that, in this passage, Kant is simply denying that animals’ representations are 
obscure concepts or judgments (as e.g. Meier held). However, this reading doesn’t account for the fact that the passage 
contrasts animals’ representations with the whole class of our representations, rather than our concepts and judgments. 
24 “Das Verstandlose [sic] Vieh hat wohl <vielleicht> etwas dem Ähnliches was wir Vorstellungen nennen (weil es den 
Wirkungen nach mit dem was Vorstellungen im Menschen sind <sehr> übereinkommt) was aber vielleicht gantz davon 
unterschieden seyn mag[.]” 
25 N.b. the pre-‘Critical’ Kant expresses no reservations about the claim that “an ox has a representation of its stable” 
(while rejecting Meier’s view that oxen possess concepts) (2:59). 
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I don’t want to overstate what these passages show. The Volckmann passage positively 
affirms that the intuitions of animals are “different in species” from any representations humans 
possess. However, as noted, “one cannot look to [lecture transcripts], in general, for precise, 
carefully worded formulations of fundamental points” (Young, 1992:xix). The Anthropology Manuscript 
passage is from Kant’s own hand, but it is much more tentative, raising the possibility that animal 
intuitions are qualitatively different without fully endorsing it. Hence, it would be unwise to make a 
positive case for Restricted Conceptualism based on these texts alone. What the passages do show is 
that the burden of proof is by no means stacked against Restricted Conceptualism. There is good 
prima facie reason to take seriously the hypothesis that, for Kant, the understanding is implicated in 
the production of human intuitions, making them qualitatively different from anything animals 
possess. I have not come across any evidence that Kant denies the existence of a qualitative 
difference between human and animal intuitions. So, if anything, these two passages make Restricted 
Conceptualism seem more likely than Nonconceptualism. 
5.2 Restricted Conceptualism in Detail 
I’ll now propose a detailed form of Restricted Conceptualism and argue that it is both prima facie 
plausible as a reading of Kant and genuinely distinct from Nonconceptualism. Since our overall goal 
is to assess the dialectical efficacy of the Argument from Animal Intuitions, I won’t seek to establish 
whether Restricted Conceptualism is ultimately superior to Nonconceptualism. (That would require 
evaluating all arguments relevant to the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate.) Instead, I’ll 
draw on an array of prima facie evidence that Nonconceptualists will likely claim is outweighed by 
other considerations. If I can show that Restricted Conceptualism is prima facie attractive (pending 
other arguments for Nonconceptualism), this will be enough to show that the Argument from 
Animal Intuitions is dialectically ineffective. 
In short, the position I propose is: (i) humans’ intuitions are produced through synthesis of 
imagination for which the understanding is responsible. (ii) In animals, merely associative 
imagination generates intuitions. (iii) Owing to this, the intuitions of animals cannot represent the 
objective temporal structures (e.g. persistence, succession) that allow us to have thoughts about the 
objects we intuit. (iv) Animals’ intuitions can still represent objects as bundles of features located in 
space. They are representations of external things, not merely subjective states. (v) But, since 
associatively generated intuitions are intrinsically incapable of being taken up into thought, they 
couldn’t belong to a human mind, the boundaries of which are fixed by the unity of apperception. 
(i) It is a familiar part of Conceptualist readings that human intuitions are produced through 
synthesis of imagination, for which the understanding is responsible. Strong prima facie evidence is 
provided by passages like those discussed in Section 3.2, e.g. “all appearances, insofar as objects are 
to be given to us through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity” (A110).26 
To my mind, the most compelling evidence that human intuitions are produced through 
synthesis of imagination is Kant’s assertion that 
 
26 N.b. “appearances” designates the objects of intuition, rather than some more demanding state such as judgment or 
experience (A20/B34, A34/B51, A35/B52), and this quotation describes a priori rules as a condition for objects being 
“given”, not for some more demanding “relation to the object” (contra Allais, 2015). 
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without it [i.e. the imagination’s “synthesis of apprehension”] we would not be able to have 
the a priori representations of space or of time, since these can be produced only through the 
synthesis of the manifold that sensibility […] provides (A99) 
and that without the imagination’s synthesis of reproduction “no whole representation […], not 
even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise” (A102). 
“Representations” encompasses both concepts and intuitions. Hence, that no representations of space 
and time can arise without synthesis of imagination entails that no intuitions of space and time can. 
One might think this evidence is outweighed by other considerations,27 but there is no denying that 
this is strong prima facie evidence that the intuitions of space and time depend on synthesis of 
imagination.28  
Plausibly, if pure intuitions require synthesis, so do our empirical intuitions. Kant holds that 
we must possess pure intuitions of space and time in order to be capable of representing the spatial 
and temporal relations exhibited by all our empirical intuitions (see A23/B38, A30/B46, 
A165/B206), which suggests that “synthesis of the imagination” is required to generate the spatial 
and temporal features of intuitions whether they are a priori or empirical. From this vantage point, it 
becomes plausible that Kant’s descriptions of the imagination’s “apprehension” of sensible material 
describe a process through which empirical intuitions are first produced, so that their material 
features depend on synthesis of imagination too.29 To be clear, I don’t intend to have established 
once and for all that, for Kant, intuitions are produced through synthesis of the imagination; we 
might still conclude that, all things considered, this evidence is outweighed. Nevertheless, there are 
solid prima facie motivations for thinking this.  
There is also good prima facie evidence that, in humans, synthesis of imagination is carried out 
by the understanding.30 Kant describes the imagination’s synthesis as “an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility” (B152) and claims that 
It is one and the same spontaneity that, there [in “synthesis of apprehension”] under the 
name of the imagination and here [in “synthesis of apperception”] under the name of 
understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition. (B162n; see also 
A79/B104–5, B130, B153) 
 
27 The most serious motivation for denying that the intuitions of space and time are produced through synthesis is the 
argument that their whole-prior-to-part structure of mereological dependence is incompatible with being produced through 
synthesis (see McLear, 2015). This merits further discussion, but see rebuttals by Land (2014), Williams (2018) and 
especially Rosefeldt (n.d.). 
28 In the light of this, there is good reason to read B160–1n as advancing the same position. Nonconceptualists have 
attempted to explain away B160–1n by claiming that it applies only to geometrical constructions, not to our most basic 
intuitions of space and time (Onof & Schulting, 2015). But there are no textual grounds for reading A99 passage in this 
way and it seriously jars with A102’s emphasis on our “most fundamental representations [erste Grundvorstellungen] of 
space and time”. 
29 E.g. B68, A79/B105, A99, A105, A120, B151, B160. 
30 Some Nonconceptualists deny this (e.g. Allais, 2009:294f.; Hanna, 2005:249; Rohs, 2001:222). More recent 
Nonconceptualist readings tend to accept that synthesis of imagination is the work of the understanding, but deny that 
intuitions depend on synthesis (e.g. Allais, 2017:32f.; Matherne, 2015:750–6.; McLear, 2015:100f.; Tolley, 2013:122f.). 
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Together, this means there is good prima facie motivation for the first part of the Restricted 
Conceptualism I’m proposing, viz. that human intuitions depend on synthesis of imagination for 
which the understanding is responsible. 
(ii) How can this be reconciled with the possibility of animal intuitions? First, we should note 
that Kant attributes imagination to animals, and that he explicitly contrasts the imaginative powers 
of animals and humans. Regarding capacities for “reproductive imagination”, he writes that they 
can be accompanied by apperception or not. When they are, then they belong only to human 
beings, when not – then animals also have them. We ought, therefore, to have two different 
names for these, but for this [capacity] there is only one [name], namely the reproductive 
power of imagination. (V-Met/Mron 29:884) 
By claiming that there ought to be two different names for this capacity, Kant is explicitly 
differentiating two species of it: reproductive imagination with and without apperception. This 
means that an animal’s imagination can combine sensible material through receptive and associative 
processes, but not according to “rules of [...] synthetic unity” (A110). 
Hitherto, Conceptualists have tended to think these kinds of imaginative process could not 
result in mental representations with intentionality.31 However, owing to the evidence discussed 
above, we should consider another possibility: that these associative processes are capable of 
generating intuitions, i.e. singular sensible representations of objects. On this reading, our intuitions 
depend on the understanding, whereas the intuitions of animals are produced by associative 
tendencies of the imagination. This interpretative route upholds the claim that human intuitions are 
produced by the understanding. In doing so, it accommodates the evidence that motivates 
traditional forms of Conceptualism. However, it also accommodates Kant’s commitment to animal 
intuitions. Therefore, it amounts to a promising form of Restricted Conceptualism. 
This is already enough to ensure that Restricted Conceptualism is distinct from 
Nonconceptualism. Nonconceptualists deny that human intuitions are produced by the 
understanding (either by claiming that intuitions precede synthesis or that they are produced through 
a non-intellectual synthesis). But there is more to be said to spell out the difference between human 
and animal intuitions and amplify the dependence of the former on the understanding. 
(iii) I’ve proposed that (there is strong prima facie evidence that) human intuitions are 
produced by the understanding, whereas animal intuitions are produced by associative imagination. 
There is good reason to think that this difference in origin leads to an intrinsic difference between 
animal and human intuitions. Kant holds that sensible representations produced by the 
understanding exhibit distinctive kinds of unity, specifically with respect to their temporal structure. 
Plausibly, all intuitions produced by the understanding exhibit one or more of the temporal 
structures which correspond to the categories, e.g. persistence (corresponding to <substance>, 
A144/B183), succession (corresponding to <cause>, ibid.).32 It is in virtue of exemplifying these 
 
31 See note 20. 
32 An anonymous reviewer questions whether Kant holds that our intuitions represent these temporal structures. But 
Kant talks of “something that persists [being] given in intuition” and characterizes “alteration” as an “intuition” (B291, 
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temporal structures that intuited objects can be subsumed under the categories (A138–40/B177–9). 
Moreover, Kant holds that our thoughts can only have relation to objects in virtue of involving the 
categories: “no object can be thought without them” (KpV 5:136); “by these concepts alone can [the 
understanding] understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object for it” 
(A80/B106; cf. A51/B75). Thoughts must deploy categories in order to relate to objects, but 
intuited objects only fall under categories in virtue of the temporal structures they exhibit. Hence, it 
is in virtue of representing these temporal structures that our intuitions allow us to think about the 
objects they present. 
In contrast, an animal’s associative power of imagination couldn’t possibly produce 
intuitions of these temporal structures. We can see this by considering Kant’s account of the 
preconditions for representing objective temporal structure: not only of producing intuitions with a 
certain subjective temporal form, but intuitions that represent objects as having a certain temporal 
form. The clearest discussion comes in the Second Analogy. Kant accepts that associative 
imagination can produce representations with subjective temporal form (i.e. they can produce a 
“subjective order of perceptions”), but argues that this is insufficient for representing temporal 
structure in the objects (i.e. they cannot produce representations of an “objective order”). This is 
because a merely associative combination of sensory material would be “entirely arbitrary” 
(A193/B238); for any temporal ordering the imagination happens to introduce, it could equally well 
have produced the reverse order (B233, A201/B246). Consequently, a temporal ordering introduced 
by associative processes will ultimately be attributable to contingencies about the perceiver, rather 
than features of the objects perceived. The result is that the temporal dimension of intuitions 
produced through mere association will not have the semantic significance of representing temporal 
structure in the objects. 
In humans, where the imagination’s combination is led by the understanding’s rules, this 
combination can be rendered “necessary” rather than “arbitrary”, enabling our intuitions to 
represent objective temporal structure.33 But in animals, nothing can remove the arbitrariness, so 
temporal structure in the objects can never be represented. It is not that animals intuit objects in the 
same way we do, and merely lack the concepts to think about them; we intuit objects as temporally 
structured unities, while animals cannot achieve this cognitive feat. And this difference has 
important ramifications: we intuit things as structured in ways that allow us to think about them; 
animals do not intuit things as having this structure. The fact that human intuitions are generated by 
 
presumably meaning that alteration is given in intuition). He also writes that “change and simultaneity” are “perceived in 
apprehension” (B225) and that “something persistent [is represented] in perception” (B275; see also A188/B231, 
A192/B237, A194/B239, A200/B245, B256, A212/B258f.). The conceptualist, who accepts the prima facie evidence that 
“apprehension” is the process through which empirical intuitions are generated, ought to read “perception” as 
equivalent to “empirical intuition” in these contexts. (Kant glosses “perception [Wahrnehmung]” as “empirical intuition” 
at A180/B222; see also Anth 6:208, MS 7:134.). This indicates that, although the principles of the Analogies express 
conditions for empirical cognition rather than mere intuition, the arguments for those principles start from the assumption 
that persistence, succession and simultaneity can be represented in empirical intuition (“perception”). (See Hutton 
(2019:601) for further discussion.) 
33 I offer a detail account of this in Hutton (2019). 
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the understanding makes them qualitatively different from animal intuitions, and no substitute for 
the understanding could produce intuitions of this kind. 
(iv) I’ll now address two objections.34 Firstly, I’ve claimed that, since the temporal form of 
animals’ intuitions is introduced by associative processes, it cannot purport to represent objective 
temporal structure.35 Doesn’t this undermine the claim that animals’ sensible representations exhibit 
intentionality at all? In response, note that the argument I’ve given is quite limited in scope: it applies 
only to representing objective temporal structures. Admittedly, I suspect it generalizes to some other 
kinds of objective connection, e.g. representing the generality of properties. An animal might 
associatively link the representations of two objects, but without rules governing which 
representations belong together, this subjective linkage would not represent the two objects as 
objectively similar, i.e. as sharing a property. (This agrees with Kant’s claims about animals’ 
incapacity to form general representations (Vo-Met/Mron 29:888).) But even this broader conclusion 
does not undermine the intentionality of animal’s mental states. Nothing I’ve argued prevents animal 
minds from representing particular features (though these may be presented as trope-like qualities 
rather than instances of universals). The same goes for spatial location: nothing in Kant’s account 
indicates that placing a feature in space requires representing an objective connection between the 
contents of different representations. Hence, Restricted Conceptualism can maintain that animals’ 
intuitions represent external things as spatially located bundles of features. In terms of 
representational content, this is importantly different from intuiting things as unified complexes 
bearing general properties. Nevertheless, animals have intentional representations of external things, 
rather than subjective states devoid of intentionality.36 
(v) Now the second objection: Kant holds that humans, as well as animals, possess 
associative powers of imagination. If associative imagination is capable of producing intuitions 
within the animal mind, why couldn’t it produce “animal-style” intuitions within the human mind, 
i.e. associatively generated intuitions that don’t represent objective temporal structures? In response 
I’ll argue that, necessarily, all human representations meet the conditions for belonging to the unity 
of apperception. This means that all our intuitions must exhibit the temporal structures 
corresponding to the categories, and therefore must be produced by the understanding. 
 
34 Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for raising these. 
35 I’ll ignore the complication that animals might have non-temporal and non-spatial “forms” of intuition (see B72). 
Plausibly, their intuitions must have at least quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal structure: quasi-spatial to allow for 
discrimination despite qualitative similarity, e.g. tracking a particular tennis ball despite the presence of other tennis balls, 
and quasi-temporal to allow for re-identification despite qualitative difference, e.g. recognising a particular human 
whether she is standing or sitting. 
36 One passage in KrV suggests that intentionality presupposes representing objective temporal structures: “the first 
thing that [the understanding] does […] is […] to make the representation of an object possible […]. Now this happens 
through its conferring temporal order on the appearances and their existence by assigning to each of these, as a 
consequence, a place in time” (A199/B244f.). However, given the context, one can read this passage as referring to the 
preconditions for representing events rather than for intentionality in general. The surrounding argument pertains 
specifically to temporal sequence; moreover, while Kant holds that every event is a “consequence”, he does not hold that 
every “appearance” is (e.g. an object’s heaviness is an appearance but not a consequence of any cause). Compare 
A194/B239, which initially appears to discuss “relation to an object” in general, before clarifying that the topic is only 
representation “as far as the temporal relation is concerned”. 
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There is plenty of evidence that Kant’s goal in the Transcendental Deduction is to establish 
just this. His stated “aim” is to show that “all sensible intuitions stand under the categories” (B143), 
that the categories apply to “all objects of our senses” (B145), and that there is a “necessary 
coherency of the understanding with appearances by means of the categories” (A119) (n.b. not just 
all “thoughts” or “cognitions”, but all “intuitions” and “objects of our senses”). The categories 
wouldn’t apply to the contents of animal-style intuitions. So, by arguing that all our intuitions must 
“stand under the categories”, he is ipso facto arguing that our minds cannot contain animal-style 
intuitions. 
It’s a difficult question how exactly Kant reaches this conclusion (equivalent to asking, 
“What is the argument of the Transcendental Deduction?”). Let me offer one possible reading, 
underscoring the difference between animal and human minds. Kant can reach the conclusion that 
all human intuitions fall under the categories via the dictum that “The “I think” must be able to 
accompany all my representations” (B131). He holds that, strictly speaking, I am a thinking being 
(see Rosefeldt, 2000:14f.), but doesn’t construe this as an immaterial substance encountered through 
introspection. Instead the thinking being is picked out procedurally, in a topic-neutral fashion, 
through the limits of possible self-ascription in first-person thought. This conception of the thinking 
being’s limits is nicely illustrated by Kant’s account of what it means to ascribe a mental 
representation to another human: to do so is to judge that it is possible for there to be a first-person 
thought in which that mental representation is self-ascribed (A347/B405; cf. A353, A354; Rosefeldt, 
2000:22–5). This makes it logically impossible to ascribe a representation to a thinking being while 
denying that he/she could become self-conscious of it (A117n., B131f.; Br 11:52).37 Applying this 
general dictum to sensible representations, we reach the conclusion that “all intuitions are nothing 
for us and have nothing at all to do with us unless they can be taken up into consciousness” (A116; 
cf. B132f., B138). But the categories are the “conditions under which alone the manifold [of 
intuition] can come together in one consciousness”; so all our intuitions must “stand under the 
categories” (B143; cf. A125). To belong to a human mind, intuitions must represent the objective 
temporal structures corresponding to the categories, and so they must be produced by the 
understanding not associative imagination.38 
Ascribing mental representations to animals is governed by entirely different rules. It doesn’t 
involve thinking it possible for the representation to be self-ascribed in a first-person thought; 
instead, it’s a matter of using analogical thinking to speculate about the causes of the behaviour we 
observe. For example, Kant claims that we ascribe representations to beavers by observing their 
dam-building, seeing the similarity with the work of human craftsmen and positing analogous mental 
causes in the beaver’s mind (KU 5:464; cf. H 7:397). Hence, the criterion for a mental 
 
37 Nonconceptualists typically maintain that human minds contain some intentional states that are not self-ascribable, 
and that self-ascribability is a precondition for a representation’s being “cognitively relevant” rather than for belonging 
to a thinking being at all. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this.) For my purposes, all that’s needed is 
that my proposed reading is prima facie plausible (though I struggle to see how the Nonconceptualist can accommodate 
Kant’s more strident statements, e.g. A116, A117n.). 
38 That Conceptualism can find a sensible argument for Kant’s stated aims in the Deduction seems a point in its favour 
(Gomes, 2014). In contrast, Nonconceptualists must accuse Kant of arguing fallaciously (Hanna, 2011) or of having 
more modest aims than the statements I’ve cited suggest (Allais, 2017:33–7). 
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representation’s belonging to an animal mind is simply that it plays a certain causal role within the 
animal’s life. 
One last clarification: if a human’s associative imagination can’t generate animal-style 
intuitions, what does it do? On the picture I’m defending, our associative processes go to work on a 
plethora of sensible representations that already stand under the categories. Rather than producing 
novel representations that don’t adhere to the categories, a human’s associative imagination takes 
categorially structured representations and combines these into novel complexes. This combining-
into-complexes can be highly idiosyncratic and non-sensical, with the associations deviating 
significantly from how the empirical world is. Nevertheless, the components of these associations 
will be unified objects with properties. This account fits with Kant’s views on the cognitive errors to 
which we are prone. Associative “habit” leads to “prejudice” when we mistake our idiosyncratic 
combinations for real patterns in the empirical world; but nowhere does Kant worry that we might 
be swayed by unruly representations that are intrinsically inaccessible to self-consciousness, as 
animal-style intuitions would be. Rather, he insists that any pernicious influence by associatively 
generated representations can always be exposed and rectified through reflection (Log 9:75f.). In 
Kant’s view, then, even the most irrational products of humans’ associative imagination will meet 
the basic preconditions required for self-consciousness, i.e. they will exhibit objective temporal 
structures corresponding to one or more of the categories. 
This completes my proposed version of Restricted Conceptualism, for which I’ve argued 
there is good prima facie evidence. Necessarily, humans’ intuitions present objects as exhibiting 
temporal structures which correspond to the categories. Such intuitions are produced, and could 
only be produced, by the understanding. Animals’ intuitions are produced by associative powers of 
imagination. At the very least, they present external things as spatially located bundles of features, 
but they cannot represent any objective temporal structure in these things. Animals not only lack the 
ability to think; they lack the ability to have intuitions of a kind that would allow intuited objects to 
be taken up into thought. 
6. Conclusion 
There is overwhelming textual evidence that Kant credits non-human animals with intuitions. But 
contrary to what many commentators have thought, this does not provide evidence for 
Nonconceptualism. This is because Restricted Conceptualism constitutes a viable reading of Kant. 
In support of this view, I argued that there is solid prima facie evidence that humans’ intuitions are 
generated by the understanding, whereas animals’ intuitions are generated by merely associative 
activities of the imagination, and that humans’ intuitions necessarily represent objects as temporally 
structured, in ways that allow us to have thoughts about them, whereas animals’ intuitions cannot 
represent these structures. I haven’t tried to establish Restricted Conceptualism outright—that 
requires an evaluation of all remaining arguments relevant to the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism 
debate. Therefore, the main conclusion to be drawn here is a dialectical one: contrary to what many 
have claimed, Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions provides no evidence for Nonconceptualism. 
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Animal intuitions can be readily accommodated by an attractive and well-motivated form of 
Conceptualism. 
Correlatively, Conceptualists must shift to Restricted Conceptualism and accept that, for 
Kant, some forms of intentional mental representation are possible in the absence of conceptual 
capacities. This is the only way for them to deal with the undeniable evidence of Kant’s commitment 
to animal intuitions. My discussion therefore leads to a reassessment of the bounds within which 
Conceptualism must operate, as well as a reassessment of the evidence for Nonconceptualism. 
Let me finish by highlighting the remaining bones of contention between Restricted 
Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. The former upholds the dependence of all human intuitions 
on the understanding. It holds that all our sensible representations of objects are transformed by the 
activities of conceptual capacities. The latter maintains that the understanding is not involved in our 
initial reception of intuitions. It holds that our most basic representations of objects are untouched 
by our intellectual nature, and hence are no different from what animals possess. Future research 
should focus on these points of controversy, especially by continuing to examine how Kant thinks 
intuitions are generated and trying to settle the debate about the aims and argumentation of the 
Transcendental Deduction. In all this, Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions should no longer be 
considered a point in favour of Nonconceptualism.39 
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